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# On Private Indirect Government

This chapter will examine another aspect of the processes described in chapter one, an aspect that the fuss over transitions to democracy and multi-partyism in Africa has overshadowed. These processes do not move in a closed orbit; they are neither smooth nor unilinear, but point in several directions at once. Further, they are occurring at different speeds and on different time-scales, and take the form of fluctuations and destabilizations (sometimes very sharp ones), periods of inertia and spurts that appear quite random but actually combine several regimes of change: stationary, dynamic, chaotic, even catastrophic.

This other aspect could be summed up in one word: *entanglement*. But that notion must not only include the coercion to which people are subjected, and the sufferings inflicted on the human body by war, scarcity, and destitution, but also embrace a whole cluster of re-orderings of society, culture, and identity, and a series of recent changes in the way power is exercised and rationalized. At the heart of these reorderings lies the issue of the relationships among the privatization of public violence, the appropriation of means of livelihood, and the imaginations of the self. Taken together, this appropriation of means of livelihood, this allocation of profits, the types of extraction thus required, and concentration of coercion involved will be described here under the general term *fiscality*.

## THE VIOLENCE OF ECONOMICS

It is impossible to approach these issues without placing three major historical processes at the very center of our analysis: first, the de-linking of Africa from formal international markets; second, the forms of its integration into the circuits of the parallel international economy; and third, the fragmentation of public authority and emergence of multiple forms of *private indirect government* accompanying these two processes.

Two key ideas inform this chapter. The first is that through these apparently novel forms of integration into the international system and the concomitant modes of economic exploitation, equally novel technologies of domination are taking shape over almost the entire continent. These new technologies result from the responses that the victorious actors in the ongoing struggles around the continent give to the following questions: Who is to be protected, by whom, against what and whom, and at what price? Who is the equal of whom? To what has one a right by virtue of belonging to an ethnic group, a region, or a religion? Who has a right to take power and govern, in what circumstances, how, for how long, and on what conditions? Who has the right to the product of whose work, and for what compensation? When may one cease to obey authority, without punishment? Who must pay taxes and where do these revenues go? Who may contract debts, and in the name of whom, and for what may they be expended? To whom do a country's riches belong? In short, who has the right to live and exist, and who has not, and why? All these questions relate to the three pillars without which no modern social order exists: definition of the prerogatives and limits of public power; codification of the rights, privileges, and inequalities tolerable in a society; and, finally, the financial underpinnings of the first two pillars. What, rather hastily, are called "transitions to democracy" are among attempts to answer these fundamental questions.<sup>1</sup> But political liberalization is only one aspect, and possibly not the most decisive one, of the profound changes under way. Because these new technologies of domination are still being elaborated, they have not yet, generally, totally replaced those already present. Sometimes they draw inspiration from the old forms, retain traces of them, or even operate behind their facade.

The second key hypothesis of this chapter is that the coherence of African societies, and their capacity for self-government and self-determination, are challenged by two sorts of threats. On the one hand, there are threats of *internal dissolution*. These arise from external pressure,

not only in the form of debt and the constraints associated with its repayment, but also of internal wars. On the other, there are the risks of a general loss of control of both public and private violence. This uncontrolled violence is sparked by worsening inequalities and corruption combined with the persistence of fundamental disagreements on how to conduct the ongoing struggles for the codification of new rights and privileges. The outcome of these profound movements may well be the final defeat of the state in Africa as we have known it in recent years. But it might equally well be a deepening of the state's indigenization,—or, more radically, its replacement by dispositifs that retain the name but have intrinsic qualities and modes of operation quite unlike those of a conventional state.

As the asymmetry of the economic performances of African countries becomes increasingly a structural matter, the de-linking of the continent from the formal international markets does not affect all countries or sub-regions, the same products or utilities within different countries or regions, with the same intensity. External constraints weigh unevenly on their economies. The failure of adjustment policies is not the same everywhere; at least, it does not produce the same effects everywhere. In any case, nothing implies that the de-linking itself is irreversible. Contrary to the articles of faith of neo-liberal orthodoxy, integration into the circuits of the parallel international economy has not been ended by efforts to liberalize import procedures. It is not even certain that, for the actors involved, concern to avoid taxation is enough to explain this phenomenon, which is not peculiar to Africa. In more or less different forms, the shift is affecting other regions of the world, such as South America, the former Soviet Union, and parts of Asia, where it is helping alter the ways incomes are made and distributed, the forms of community, the structures for representing and mediating economic and political interests, the conditions in which are appropriated resources necessary for the reproduction of the dominant social relations, issues of citizenship, and even the very nature of the state.<sup>2</sup>

But in Africa, the current and foreseeable consequences of this shift are of an altogether different order and intensity. This shift is taking off when, with the Cold War no longer structuring relations of force worldwide, and with Africa “demoted” internationally, the continent is *turning inward on itself* in a very serious way—and the hackneyed notions of crisis and “marginalization” do not begin to do justice to the process at work. This turning inward is occurring on the scale of similar processes in the mid-nineteenth century, when an economy based on the

slave trade gave way to one based on so-called legitimate trade; then, these processes ended in conquest and colonial occupation.<sup>3</sup>

Their impact differed, of course, from region to region, and with speeds and patterns varying with local circumstances (such as whether a society was on the coast or in the hinterland or in-between, and whether it had or lacked state forms).<sup>4</sup> Yet, the structural adjustment involved in the shift from an economy based on the slave trade (sale of slaves and ivory) to an economy based on trade in cash products (ground nuts, palm oil, gum arabic, etc.) led to a transformation of the material bases of states. The ways those states enhanced their values, multiplied utilities, and distributed the product of labor also changed.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, territorial growth, contraction, and withdrawal had always played a key role in the process of state formation in Africa.<sup>6</sup> As early as the seventeenth century, this process was already affecting several polities along the Atlantic as well as further into the hinterland. A tradition of predatory states living by raiding, capturing and selling captives, was reinforced. Against a background of territorial fragmentation and structural stagnation, slaving military regimes, devoid of civil responsibility, had come into being, and provided themselves with means, not necessarily of conquering territory and extending their rule, but of seizing resources in men and goods.<sup>7</sup>

Others, no less brutal, adopted a policy of assimilating their captives. Instead of using them as human merchandise, they compelled them to provide services in kind and in labor, or imposed on defeated peoples heavy tributes and taxes.<sup>8</sup> On the Slave Coast in particular (Allada and Whydah), interminable disorder led to a prolonged weakening and eventual collapse of royal power. Local chiefs took advantage of this to secure their own independence, but rivalries within the elite sharpened and these state formations lapsed into civil wars destroying what little political order remained.<sup>9</sup>

As these processes of dislocation were occurring, movements were under way to reconstruct and relegitimize authority. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, for example, Dahomey conquered its neighbors, undermined by internecine disputes. But while war could serve for the permanent conquest and occupation of territories subject to periodic raiding, the use of violence did not, alone, necessarily resolve the problem of stabilizing the political order and government. Thus, having taken power on the death of Agaja after violent succession struggles and challenges to the monarchy by the priesthood, Tegbesu attempted to reunify the elite of Dahomey by embarking in the 1740s on a policy of terror,

purges, and compromises. The combination of these three levers of domination enabled him, on the one hand, physically to eliminate his most determined enemies and, on the other, to intervene in factional struggles at the local level by throwing his support behind those who accepted his authority. At the same time, he lavished gifts and largesse on local chiefs and influential families. Then, by skilful manipulation of dynastic and kinship networks, the institution and spectacular display of a royal cult (human sacrifices), and redefinition of the attributes of royalty beneath a mask of continuity (redistribution of wealth and enjoyments, overhaul of the legal order), he embarked on an effort to relegitimize power, to convert raw violence into authority.<sup>10</sup>

In areas in the interior subject to Muslim influence, similar transformations occurred. Before the second half of the nineteenth century, the empires along the edge of the desert had established areas they raided for captives, south and east of the Lake Chad basin. Wars to take captives and slaves did more than make it possible to build up military apparatuses, or to manage resources and populations in the framework of an economy based on tribute. While these forms of violence manifested themselves in destruction, depredation, and banditry, they also, in some cases, favored the emergence of centralized systems. At any event, they were certainly responsible for highly specific modes of political organization and forms of social reconstruction. This was the case with the relationships between sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship. Contrary to received opinion, the idea that political power and sovereignty were closely associated with land was not unknown.<sup>11</sup> Discourses on land and “indigenoussness” were common coin, and the logics of territorialization went hand in hand with those of controlling “insiders” and excluding “outsiders.” But territory was not the exclusive underpinning of political communities, the sole mark of sovereignty, or the sole basis of civil obedience. Space was represented and used in many ways, especially when those representations and uses were closely tied to the definition of the principles of belonging and exclusion.<sup>12</sup> In a context where raiding to take captives was an everyday occurrence, the process of building political spaces and areas of sovereignty could include the imposition of tribute on, for example, those defeated whose lives had been spared. Citizenship could be linked with how much protection one enjoyed against the possibility of capture and sale. Kinship relations, for example, were replaced by or combined with other forms of relationship—those creating dependents, slaves, clients, pawns. Other modalities of legitimate exploitation also came into being. A blending of political, cultural, and re-

ligious identities was under way, diasporas coming into being. Within these truly transnational and multicultural societies, religious and trading networks became inextricably entangled. Neither force nor the fact of belonging to a particular territory ever put an end, in practice, to the multiplicity of allegiances and the comings and goings between a local time and a regional time.

But during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Muslim frontier moved, and vast areas of the northern part of central Africa were caught between pushes from the Nile and from the west. Slavery as a relation of subjection and as the supreme means of increasing goods and utilities intensified, at the same time as did the quest for ivory. Conquests, migrations, and other movements of populations fleeing marauders, mercenaries, and slave traders precipitated the transformation of customary models of social organization, registers of political action, and forms of exchange. The model of domination—half-suzerain, half-sultanic—that resulted from these upheavals reached its highest form with the Khar-toumites.<sup>13</sup> With the support of the *jallaba* (itinerant brokers whose activity in the region predated the arrival of the Egyptians), they militarized trade and specialized in slave raiding and the exploitation of ivory. Proceeding by military force, extortion, political alliances, incorporation of slaves, and a judicious redistribution of tribute, booty, and the products of long-distance trade, they set up the system of *zariba* (small fortified trading colonies). Where necessary, they concluded pacts with the local people and thus formed networks that dominated this whole area until the Mahdist revolt.<sup>14</sup>

Along the Atlantic seaboard, as well as inland, a large number of independent political units disintegrated under the burden of external debt and domestic tyranny.<sup>15</sup> In the course of the nineteenth century, these dislocations led to major cultural realignments marked by mass conversion to monotheistic religions,<sup>16</sup> acute crises of witchcraft,<sup>17</sup> appearance of numerous healing cults, transformation of refugee communities into mercenary bands, and a number of uprisings in the name of Islam.<sup>18</sup> The fall-off in demand for slaves did not lead to a reduction of tensions; on the contrary, the peoples and ethnic groups that had successfully maintained their privileges as brokers and secured their domination over the great commercial nodal points accentuated their demographic expansion and supplied themselves with guns.<sup>19</sup>

Under the leadership of the heads of slaving bands, armed cliques, and trading adventurers (El-Zubeir Pasha, Rabeh and the slave-trading sultans along the Ubangi, the Afro-Arab Tipu Tipp, Msiri of Katanga, Mi-

rambo and his trading empire north of Tabora), movements of predators emerged.<sup>20</sup> They reactivated the caravan trade; through raiding, the authoritarian tribute system, the recruitment of thousands of carriers, and the local continuation of slavery, they aggravated the fragility of customary structures, scrambled the ancestral charters, and precipitated major population movements.<sup>21</sup> These new operators (traffickers, brokers, leaders of bands, marabouts, traders of various stripes) sought to turn economic change to their own advantage. Using war as a resource, they established more or less informal taxation systems and took control of the main commercial nodal points and regional trading networks. Equipped with quasi-extraterritorial rights and through raiding, seizure of booty, and levying of tribute, they succeeded in criminalizing not only economic activity but the very act of governing.

After the bloodletting of the slave trade, Africa bounced back into the international economic system, in a way that involved the extraction of its resources in raw form. This regime of violence and brutality was prolonged toward the end of the century through the concessionary regimes.<sup>22</sup> These large companies equipped with commercial and mining privileges, and with sovereign rights allowing them to raise taxes and maintain an armed force, accentuated the prevailing predation and the atomization of lineages and clans, and institutionalized a regime based on murder. Under the protection of the colonial bureaucratic apparatus, the market began to function in gangster mode.<sup>23</sup>

The developments set out above had decisive consequences—some parallel, others causative. First, almost everywhere, growth in the indebtedness of local rulers and trading élites led to African polities losing external power, thus exposing themselves to serious threats of internal dissolution. Second, while not attaining the levels of the slave trade period, the violence and predation required by the new form of integration into the international economy led not only to the militarization of power and trade and the intensification of extortion, but also to a complete dislocation of the trade-offs that had previously governed the relationship between holding public power and pursuing private gain.<sup>24</sup> The race for ivory and rubber, and an economy based on trading stations and concessions, completed the dislocation of these trade-offs between 1850 and 1925.<sup>25</sup> Finally, these developments substantially altered the ideas individuals had of their membership in a political community, and of the shape of that community. Everything was redrawn: forms of religious identities; procedures by which authority was legitimized; social and political construction of rights, duties, transfers, and obligations; even the

norms that governed the rules of civility and contracts, commercial morality, and civic virtue.<sup>26</sup>

But these comments must not lead to the conclusion that Africa is moving backwards, and that everything happening today is simply a rerun of a scenario, of a historical moment wrongly thought over and done with. While taking some characteristics from models of early imperial occupation and stagnation in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the new forms of the “disemboweling” of the continent are not identical with the old, for several reasons. First, compared to that of the nineteenth century, today’s shift, or “exit,” is occurring in the opposite direction—that is, from the formal international economy toward the underground channels whose tentacles, however “invisible,” are worldwide (from drugs and arms trafficking to money laundering).<sup>27</sup> Second, during the nineteenth century, loss of competitiveness was not absolute, and the region still retained significant shares of international markets, at least in some tropical products.<sup>28</sup>

This “exit” is not purely and simply “de-linking,”<sup>29</sup> or “disengagement,” or even “marginalization” in the strict sense.<sup>30</sup> As the obverse side of “world time” in which are entangled a multiplicity of flows, it is one aspect of a complex movement unfolding on a global scale.<sup>31</sup> In this intermeshing of temporalities, several processes co-exist; there are processes tending to make peoples view the world in increasingly like ways, and, at the same time, processes producing differences and diversities.<sup>32</sup> In short, contradictory dynamics are at work, made up of time-lags, disjunctures, and different speeds; it is too easy to reduce these dynamics to simple antagonism between internal and external forces. More starkly, the developments now under way combine—and, in Africa, are *creating systems* in such an original way that the result is not only debt, the destruction of productive capital, and war, but also the disintegration of the state and, in some cases, its wasting away and the radical challenging of it as a “public good,” as a general mechanism of rule, or as the best instrument for ensuring the protection and safety of individuals, for creating the legal conditions for the extension of political rights, and for making possible the exercise of citizenship.

How singular this evolution is becomes clear when one considers the effects—not the anticipated but the actual effects—of structural adjustment policies and the dynamics of *conditionality*—economic conditions attached to loans granted African countries by international financial institutions over the last ten, or more, years. First, it has not been sufficiently stressed, in this connection, that one major political event of the last quar-

ter of the twentieth century was the crumbling of African states' independence and sovereignty and the (surreptitious) placing of these states under the tutelage of international creditors. Making allowance for differences of scale, this is reminiscent of the situation affecting Egypt and Tunisia in the 1870s when, to repay their debts, those countries had imposed on them a consular-type system and, against the background of the dissolution of political authority, were deprived of significant attributes of their sovereignty, especially in financial and fiscal matters.<sup>33</sup> By the end of the 1980s, African countries were inaugurating a similar model. The collapse of their external power had placed many states in a situation that might be described as "fractionated sovereignty." The *tutelary government* exercised by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and private and public lenders was no longer limited to imposing respect for broad principles and macro-economic balances. In practice, the tutelage of international creditors was considerably strengthened and now involves a range of direct interventions in domestic economic management, credit control, implementing privatizations, laying down consumption requirements, determining import policies, agricultural programs and cutting costs—or even direct control of the treasury.<sup>34</sup>

This situation—which cannot be treated as simply a process of recolonization—has nothing peculiarly African about it, since other countries around the world have been, or still are, subjected to the same steam roller.<sup>35</sup> But two major consequences make the African case stand out. First, through the harshness of the exactions required, the redeployment of constraints, and the new forms of subjection imposed on the most deprived and vulnerable segments of the population, this form of government forces features belonging to the realm of warfare and features proper to the conduct of civil policy to coexist in a single dynamic.

There is no need for any reminder that throughout the 1980s, the dominant explanation for the "African crisis" consisted in placing responsibility on the state and its supposed excessive demands on the economy. It was asserted that restoring the state's legitimacy and emerging from crisis depended on its capacity to resist the pressures from society (organization of public services, health, education, allocation of resources and revenues, and redistribution of all sorts) and let market forces operate autonomously and freely.<sup>36</sup> In other words, the shift to a market economy required the suspension of individuals' roles in politics and as citizens—that is, the emasculation of the interplay of rights and claims enabling people to have not only duties and obligations toward the state but also rights against it, rights that can be asserted politically, for ex-

ample, in the form of entitlement to such public services as education or health care. But, by doing everything possible to dismantle state intervention in the economy (such as controls, subsidies, protection), without making the state more efficient and without giving it new, positive functions, the result has been that the state's (already very fragile) material base has been undermined, the logics underlying the building of coalitions and clienteles have been upset (without being positively restructured), its capacities for reproduction have been reduced, and the way has been opened for it to wither away.

Second, as indicated in the previous chapter, the controls, subsidies, and protections today targeted for dismantling were more than fiscal and administrative mechanisms. Their purpose was not simply distributive or, in some cases, productive; they also made possible a range of conceptions of legitimate political action and of accepted (or tolerated) forms of social control. Combined, they gave rise to a degree of social and political cohesion—in short, underpinned a form of domination that did, it is true, involve coercion, but also involved transfers, reciprocity, and obligations. This was the form of government that, in most cases, prevented a slide into completely arbitrary rule and raw violence.

This is also what had, in the end, endowed some regimes with a minimum of social acceptance. They could require the submission and obedience of their subjects in exchange for a general “salarization” of society. To a large extent, “salary-earner,” “citizen,” and “client” reciprocally reproduced one another—or, at any event, participated in a single structure of conscious representations well described by what has been called “the politics of the belly.”<sup>37</sup> It is this model of domination—that is, control of people and allocation of goods, benefits, and percentages—that is challenged by austerity, the burden of the external constraint, war and economic decay. As a result of the general insolvency and material devastation, almost everywhere in the region is, now, a situation in which the state is unable to make necessary decisions on who is to get what, and to determine the social compromises vital not only to any significant shift to a market economy, as envisaged by international financial agencies, but also to the very production of public order.

Third, by displacing the site where political, regulatory, and technical choices are made, not only have the very sources of power been transferred to international trustees just when some attributes of sovereignty were being “deleted.” What has also happened is that the sources of legitimacy and influence have also been displaced, and, in so doing, the criteria of accountability have been blurred, since those who impose the

policies are not merely “invisible” to the eyes of the population but are also different from those who must answer for their consequences to the people. And those who have to answer for those policies to the people act as if by procuration, not on the basis of that *sovereign capacity* supposed to characterize the state. The financial stranglehold and the fiscal crisis have helped to increase conflicts over the redistribution of means of livelihood and perks—of, that is, allocation of bank credit, award of public contracts, attribution of such privileges, advantages, and subsidies as remain, allocation of facilities and infrastructure projects, ethno-regional distribution of import-export licenses, scholarships, loans, jobs, and favors. Helped by these conflicts, there has been a flowering of highly contradictory conceptions of what the “political community” should be or what should be the articulation between various sorts of “citizenship” within a single political space, such as ethnicity and nation, indigenes and immigrants.

Almost everywhere, the state has lost much of that capacity to regulate and arbitrate that enabled it to construct its legitimacy. It no longer has the financial means, administrative power, and, in general, the sorts of “goods” that would have enabled it to resolve politically the conflicts that have erupted in the public domain and led, almost universally, to violence previously containable within more or less tolerable limits. Having no more rights to give out or to honor, and little left to distribute, the state no longer has credit with the public. All it has left is control of the forces of coercion, in a context marked by material devastation, disorganization of credit and production circuits, and an abrupt collapse of notions of public good, general utility, and law and order. The upshot is an increase in resources and labor devoted to war, a rise in the number of disputes settled by violence, a growth of banditry, and numerous forms of privatization of lawful violence. Contrary to the assertions of a rather sloppy literature, however, such phenomena are not automatically indicators of chaos. It is important to see in them, also, struggles aimed at establishing new forms of legitimate domination and gradually restructuring formulas of authority built on other foundations.<sup>38</sup>

The hegemony of state administration has thus broken down partly under the impact of structural adjustment policies. But neither the promised restructuring of the system of productive capital accumulation nor the reintegration of Africa into world markets has occurred. The compromises—rules, rights, obligations—that, though costly, ensured the stability of certain postcolonial models of governance (until the first oil shock) have been disrupted. The resulting disorder and apparent chaos is amplified

by the interaction between, on the one hand, social protest and the weight of inertia, and, on the other, the increasingly ineffectual efforts of local tyrannies to end dissent by force.<sup>39</sup> But what, in the short run, has every appearance of chaos represents, in the long run, a violent resurgence of struggles over inequality and control of the means of coercion. This is evidenced by the brutality with which, at every level of society, relations of loyalty and submission, relations of exchange, reciprocity, and coercion, and the terms of exclusion and incorporation—in short, all the modalities of legitimate subjection—are being renegotiated.<sup>40</sup>

Nothing guarantees that these struggles will automatically lead to more frugal forms of government, or that they will result in a state governed by law and more democratic forms of citizenship, at least in the classic sense of these notions. Against those theoretical approaches that would reduce the range of historical choices gestating in Africa to a stark alternative of either “transition” to democracy and the shift to a market economy, or descent into the shadows of war, we must stress again *the role of contingency*, and reassert the hypothesis that the organizations likely to emerge from current developments will be anything but the result of coherent premeditated plans.

#### PUBLIC POWER AND PRIVATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE MASKS OF THE STATE

If such is the case, we must turn our backs not only on superficial analyses as practiced by Africanist political science but also on structural-functionalism and determinism of any sort. As has happened throughout African history, the results of developments under way will be at best paradoxical, and African states may well follow different itineraries. Fragmentation, break-up, concentration of power to the benefit of a small number of regional powers, reproduction of lineage or chieftaincy logics within the state, or accentuation of practices reflecting dual power are within the range of the possible. But, whatever the diversity of trajectories that local societies take, the future of the state will be settled, as has happened previously in the world, at the point where the three factors of war, coercion, and capital (formal or informal, material or symbolic) meet.<sup>41</sup> There is, then, something to be gained by considering a series of significant scenarios of which glimmers can be made out emerging from the struggles now under way. These glimpses suggest that not only a different structuring of African societies, but also a radical shift in their material order, are in progress.

New organizational solutions are being tried. Not all tend toward the consolidation of the state as a general mechanism for domination and the production of order, toward institution of a market economy according to criteria laid down in advance as a matter of doctrine, or toward collapse into never-ending chaos.<sup>42</sup>

Let's pause here and recall that the *turning-in* of African societies on themselves is taking place in a context marked by both the progressive dismantling of the state and, in the name of efficiency gains, the denial of the legitimacy of its intervention in economic matters; (some consequences of these two processes have already been briefly set out in this chapter). The premises of policies that have led to the progressive dismantling of the state is, as will be recalled, that the state as a productive structure has failed in Africa, and that an economic organization governed by the free play of market forces represents the most efficient way of securing the optimal allocation of resources. The translation of this idea in terms of economic policy has led, among other things, to sale of public assets, freeing of de facto monopolies, privatization of collective goods and services, changes in customs regulations, revision of exchange rates—in short, to partial or total transfer of what was public capital into private hands. Of course, looked at from a purely economic standpoint, numerous experiences indicate that the effects of a change in the ownership of capital are slight and point to the relatively secondary character of ownership compared to other criteria such as market structure, organizational and strategic choices made by enterprises, levels of competition, availability of labor, relationship between wage costs and productivity, or quality of human capital. But, in the African context, privatizations fundamentally alter the processes whereby wealth is allocated, income distributed, and ethno-regional balances regulated, as well as the narrowly political notions of public good and general interest<sup>43</sup>.

Moreover, the policies just discussed have not simply opened the way to substantial alienation of the political sovereignty of African states. More decisively, they have created the conditions for a *privatization of this sovereignty*<sup>44</sup>. But the struggle to privatize state sovereignty largely overlaps the struggle to concentrate and then *privatize the means of coercion*, because control of the means of coercion makes it possible to secure an advantage in the other conflicts under way for the appropriation of resources and other utilities formerly concentrated in the state.<sup>45</sup> In other words, leaving aside variations from one sub-region to another, one characteristic of the historical sequence unfolding in Africa is *the direct link that now exists between, on the one hand, deregulation and the primacy*

*of the market and, on the other, the rise of violence and the creation of private military, paramilitary, or jurisdictional organizations.*

Two sets of questions arise. First, how is the struggle to concentrate the means of coercion fought? Under what circumstances will it be possible to produce what type of political order on the ruins of the old; and under what (other) circumstances is the likely result the defeat of the state as the general technology of domination, and what arrangements and organizations will take its place, overlie it, or function behind its mask? Second, since every economy is always underpinned by the use of force, lawful or unlawful, civil or criminal, under what circumstances might the coercion thus concentrated in the hands of a few be converted into labor productivity; and under what other circumstances might the violence thus unleashed, far from being economically oriented, threaten to degenerate into pure chaos and rapine?

A few indicators suggest answers. On the one hand, the concentration of the means of coercion may be difficult to achieve using conventional resources—that is, those the state used before the current stage; such resources no longer exist, or are no longer available in the previous quantities. At its most extreme, the very existence of the postcolonial state as a general technology of domination is at risk.<sup>46</sup> It is true that, nominally, a central authority continues to exist. Its formal structure remains more or less intact, as does the formalism of its rituals, its spectacle, and its disciplines.<sup>47</sup> The principle of appointment remains, in theory, in the hands of an autocrat who makes no bones about using it. In some cases, a vestige of an administrative imaginary survives, although the institutions and bureaucracies supposed to give it flesh have collapsed. Very commonly, hierarchy or centralized pyramidal organization may no longer exist. Orders issued from on high are rarely carried out; if they are, it is never without major distortions and alterations. The interlocutors change all the time, at every level. As official job descriptions do not always correspond to real effective powers, it is not uncommon for higher authorities to be accountable to those at a lower level. Where real powers exist and are used, this happens not by virtue of law or regulation, but often on the basis of informal, contingent arrangements, which can be reviewed at any time without notice. As most business is conducted orally, administrative activity is no longer necessarily recorded in writing.

In practice, many jobs no longer require professional training, even if the rule that they do remains in force. The work of officials no longer requires commitment to their posts; bureaucrats can use their labor power

for other purposes, in time supposed to be spent on the job. In extreme cases, they may sell their job as a source of income or private rents to top off their salaries (where salaries are still paid). Once this point is reached, they are serving only themselves. In some cases, their work is no longer remunerated with a salary;<sup>48</sup> the salary has been replaced by “one-off payments.” A formal budget is prepared, but it is executed and adhered to on purely contingent and informal criteria. There is a proliferation not of independent power centers but of more or less autonomous pockets in the heart of what was, until recently, a system. Such pockets are intermeshed, compete with one another, and sometimes form networks.<sup>49</sup> They form links in an unstable chain where parallel decisions coexist with centralized decisions, where everything and its opposite are possible. In this situation, proper procedures are frequently by-passed, rules chopped and changed, and then usually bent, and actions are structurally unpredictable—a combination of situations in which nothing gets done, and sudden, erratic, accelerated movements, unforeseen consequences, and paradoxical outcomes. All this leads to an extraordinary waste of the energy required to carry on interminable haggling and bargaining.

While such a situation makes it difficult to characterize postcolonial African societies as “stateless societies,”<sup>50</sup> it is nevertheless fertile ground for the appearance, all over the continent, of forms of *indirect private government*. To grasp the scale of the various forms of privatization of sovereignty, it is important to recall again that the struggle for the concentration and private control of the means of coercion has taken place in a context marked both by the world-wide deregulation of markets and money movements, and by the inability of postcolonial states to pay their debts or even raise taxes. Put differently, functions supposed to be public, and obligations that flow from sovereignty, are increasingly performed by private operators for private ends. Soldiers and policemen live off the inhabitants; officials supposed to perform administrative tasks sell the public service required and pocket what they get. The question is how such a manner of ruling becomes institutionalized and becomes part of that form of government we are describing as *indirect private government*.

Of help in this regard is what Weber called *discharge*—a set of operations originally executed by the state, but that, at some point, found their way into the hands of adventurers, becoming the basis of oriental feudalism. According to Weber, the system of *discharge* developed from the disintegration of the money economy and the risk to oriental political regimes of collapse into a barter economy.<sup>51</sup> Weber distinguishes three methods of *discharge*, each applicable to Ptolemaic Egypt, India, China,

or the Caliphate from the tenth century. In these models, tax collection was delegated to private hands or to soldiers who paid themselves from the taxes they collected. Raising taxes was like raising recruits. In this way, a set of institutions was gradually put in place that, like the vassalage institutions of the feudal period, enjoyed considerable autonomy, both from those above and those below. To Weber, this system of *discharge* as a technique of government was not the expression of a cultural trait peculiar to the Orient; moreover, it was the same type of domination that had made it possible to administer Rome when the city was transformed into a continental empire. The contrast between discharge in the East and discharge in the West rested on the fact that, in the East, extraction of forced payments won out over exploitation associated with the *corvée*, with increased risks of collapse into a barter economy.

The historical process unfolding in Africa does not reproduce the Weberian model of *discharge* to the letter. On the one hand, while, in several areas of the continent, there has been a collapse into a barter economy and actual withdrawal from the cash economy, the major phenomenon remains the practice of *barter within a cash economy*, as is evidenced by the ways state receipts are pre-financed (as in the forward sale of mining resources against budgetary advances) or the massive giveaway of mines and property to private companies or operators paying a rent. On the other, the general context of the ongoing developments is one of acute *material scarcity*. This has to do with the subsistence crisis in a number of countries.<sup>52</sup> This crisis involves various forms of shortage and famine as well as difficulties of supply. Its intensity varies from region to region, and there are striking contrasts between town and country and between the rich, the less rich, and the impoverished, but almost everywhere, individuals' resources have undergone sometimes drastic reductions just as pressures bore down more heavily: assorted taxes and required payments, fragmentation of property, indebtedness and pawning, rising rent, losses of status. Lastly, this subsistence crisis is tied up with upheaval in the circumstances in which Africans are determining the value and price that they put on enterprises and goods—with, that is, the undermining of the *equivalences* they had been used to making between *people* and *things*, even between life and death.<sup>53</sup>

A central aspect of this crisis has to do with the dynamic of the relationship between what might be called “real money” and its opposite, as well as with the extraordinary volatility of prices.<sup>54</sup> Currency depreciation has led almost everywhere to a sharp fall in the price of non-tradeable goods.<sup>55</sup> This has particularly been the case with the real remuneration

ation of work. Often, changes in the parity of currencies have had no effect on the competitiveness of economies, whereas the bill for imports essential to production has risen. Fluctuating and rising prices have been accompanied by an unprecedented cash shortage. As already indicated, whole regions of the continent have been caught up in de-linking from the money economy, while the capacities of state authorities to extract cash payments in the form of taxes have never been so weak.

In the shadow of armed conflicts, the massive deployment of violence required to restore authoritarianism almost everywhere, and the deregulation of the economy, conditions for the establishment of private powers are gradually being realized. In the context of war, this evolution takes the form of placing people unable to find refuge and safety elsewhere under various forms of pawnship. In some cases, vast systems of production have been set up based on forced labor and taxes in kind (delivery of food, firewood, portage, etc.).<sup>56</sup> In the refugee camps and in places to which people have been forcibly relocated, a different economy, other forms of rule, are appearing. Everywhere, too, war—and not only war—is accompanied by the rise of a culture of immunity that ensures that private actors guilty of publicly admitted crimes go unpunished.<sup>57</sup> For example, troops assume a right to pillage and rape; towns and villages are sacked; death is administered publicly. A deliberate attempt is made to terrorize people. And no one is prosecuted for anything.

Exemption from taxation, and judicial immunity, are also granted those who, while continuing to occupy senior positions in what remains of the state apparatus, have been able to convert these into sources of enrichment in the national, regional, and international channels of the parallel economy. The same exemption and immunity are granted numerous foreign middlemen, religious and secret networks, and so-called humanitarian organizations, some long-established, some only recently arrived.

In some circumstances, war and austerity also create the conditions for extension of domination beyond the bounds of lineage. They lend themselves to the elaboration of new forms of servitude, coercion, and dependence. The issue is thus not so much to know whether indicators of a system of *discharge* and allocation of fiefs exist; it is to know under what circumstances the private powers coming into being will be successful in using violence to build domains, usurp rights of authority and public jurisdictional powers, and provide themselves with immunities sufficiently secure to allow crystallization, over time, of arrangements of

*productive servitude*—that is, arrangements capable of providing the basis for a different, albeit violent, model of accumulation.

Meanwhile, mention must be made of the appearance, throughout the region, of armed organizations, official and semi-official, specialized in the use of force—in short, new institutions charged with administering violence. Armed formations are not simply useful to wage war; they can also be used as a weapon in the re-establishment of authoritarian rule. To deal with the protest movements that have everywhere accompanied the demand for multi-party politics, most African regimes have given free rein to the soldiery (police, gendarmes, political police, so-called internal security forces, and, if need be, special presidential forces). They have let these forces collect their pay from the inhabitants, first under cover of so-called law and order operations, and then in the everyday administration of coercion—road blocks, raids, forced tax collection, illegal seizures, rackets, and a host of special favors. Helped by the prevailing lack of discipline, bridges have been built between the soldiery and the worlds of crime and fraud. In some countries, the situation has reached such a point that it is no longer excessive to speak of “tonton-macoutization.”<sup>58</sup>

The lapse into “tonton-macoutism” takes several forms. In many countries, to soften the impact of civil and economic disobedience campaigns on public finances, seizures and confiscations of property have been stepped up. Under cover of collecting taxes or redistributing land, goods have been destroyed or resold; in some cases, production and wholesale facilities have been occupied by the army. Periodically, markets have been set on fire—the aim being to punish the traders, transporters, and other social categories most active in the protest movements, or to ensure the disappearance of evidence of corruption or of other compromising documents. Often, troops force shops to close, then attack the petty businesses that people in urban areas resort to for survival. To a greater degree than its precedents, this new form of coercion thus has economic wellsprings. But it is important not to lose sight of the strictly political functions of this economic coercion. Where the build-up of arrears of payment, advances on mining receipts, pre-financing of cash-crop harvests, and other expedients are not enough to keep state finances afloat, the state’s reduction of the population to the status of “clients” can no longer be achieved through “salarization.” It must instead be mainly achieved through controlling access to the parallel economy. The end of the “salary” as the chief means of reducing the population to the status of clients, and its replacement by “one-off payments,” transforms the bases on which the

interplay of rights, transfers, and obligations—that is the very definition of postcolonial citizenship—rests. Henceforth, “citizens” are those who can have access to the networks of the parallel economy, and to the means of livelihood for survival that that economy makes possible.

Moreover, the trend becomes for the everyday management of coercion to be decentralized and privatized, with the emergence of local cliques taking advantage of this turn to realize illicit gains and settle personal scores. It is no longer simply a matter of exploiting bureaucratic positions through sinecures that bring in extra income, the traffic in public authority involving a conception of offices as goods to be bought and sold. In some cases, the situation is such that everyone collects a tax from his or her subordinates and from the customers of the public service, with the army, the police, and the bureaucracy operating like a racket, squeezing those it administers. As P. Veyne observed of the later Roman Empire, “When things reach this pass, it is pointless to speak of abuses or corruption: it has to be accepted that one is dealing with a novel historical formation,”<sup>59</sup> a quite specific mode of regulating behavior, distributing penalties, and enjoying services.

We are thus dealing with a mode of deploying force and coercion that has its own positivity. Relations of subjection adapted to times of shortage and material scarcity are being introduced and institutionalized.<sup>60</sup> These relations are formed through tolls, extortion, and exactions. Tolls, extortion, and exactions are, in turn, linked to a particular conception of *commandement*, and its circulation throughout society. This relation of subjection is replacing the one that used to bind people to one another, not necessarily in contracts or compacts, but in networks of reciprocal obligations, acts of generosity, respect, gifts, and honor that would often take the form of sumptuary expenditure.<sup>61</sup> But the extortion, tolls, and various taxes peculiar to a time of austerity are occurring in a climate of violence where looting, confiscation, and pillage are becoming the favored means of acquiring and consuming wealth.<sup>62</sup> Liberality as a means of government is being replaced by forced payments, generalized taxes, and a range of impositions.

By breaking the link built on reciprocity and transfers, and resorting to unilateral coercion, the actors who control what remains of postcolonial African states are seeking to ground these states on different bases. In the struggles unleashed by this shift, those who control the means of coercion have a clear advantage.<sup>63</sup> In practice, they can arrogate the attributes of private lordship, the public power of the potentate and hangers-on extending to resources as well as people. Hav-

ing command over individuals thus becomes inseparable from use of their property and administration of their death. In such circumstances, taxation is transformed into an extended category for which no consent is required and no demand tied to any precise idea of public utility or common good. Raising taxes ceases to be one aspect of the state monopoly of coercion, and becomes rather one aspect of the loss of that monopoly and of its dispersion within society. In other words, there is no longer difference between taxation and exaction. To territorialize domination, there is no hesitation in resorting either to the support of foreign mercenaries or to the formation of parallel forces, militias, and action groups of roughs recruited from a single ethnic group, from a number of ethnic groups, from refugees, or from the common people in general.

Finally, the corollary of the privatization of public violence, and of its deployment in aid of private enrichment, is the accelerated development of a shadow economy over which elements of the police, the army, the customs, and the revenue services attempt to ensure their grip, through drug trafficking, counterfeiting money, trade in arms and toxic waste, customs frauds etc. Should they be successful, such a grip could hasten the elimination from this sector of whole social groups, who, as a result of the austerity policies, get what they need in this economy outside of wage labor or direct patronage. What is therefore at stake is the possibility of new ways and means of subjecting and controlling people.

However, not enough stress has been laid on the decisive character of the international supports this process enjoys. The extraordinary grip of private networks and lobbies, the influence of the military, and the perversion of bureaucratic procedures have facilitated the consolidation in most countries of rent situations used to pay not only the indigenous potentates but also a whole host of middlemen, businessmen, mercenaries, and traffickers with links to intelligence circles, the army, gambling, money laundering, and, sometimes, crime. In countries subject to French influence, the money-making that was already a feature of Gaullist networks has been expanded and intensified under cover of managing privatizations, debts, gifts, loans, advances and subsidies, tax rebates, and assorted claims. Today, hardly any sector, even the diplomatic service, is free of corruption and venality.

With the help of privatizations and structural adjustment programs, there is emerging an economy based on concessions, made up of lucrative monopolies, secret contracts, private deals, and privileges in the tobacco, timber, transport, transit, and agro-industry sectors, in large-scale proj-

ects, in oil, uranium, lithium, manganese, and arms purchasing, in the training and officering of armies and tribal militias, and in the recruitment of mercenaries. What is occurring is not, as is claimed by scholars, a process of “disengagement,” but a process in which international networks of foreign traffickers, middlemen, and businessmen are linking with, and becoming entwined with, local businessmen, “technocrats,” and warlords, causing whole areas of Africa’s international economic relations to be swept underground, making it possible to consolidate methods of government that rest on indiscriminate violence and high-level corruption.

Symptomatic of these economic changes is what appears to be the exhaustion of the model of the “territorial state” characterized by institutional differentiation, centrality and verticality of political relations, spatial demarcation, monopoly of the exercise of legitimate violence, and collection of authorized taxation.<sup>64</sup> The dogma of the “inviolability of the borders inherited from colonialism” is being flouted—not in the sense of uncontrollable outbreaks of separatist fever leading to an irreversible break-up of the territorial framework of postcolonial states, on the model of Yugoslavia, but in the sense that identity pressures, dynamics of autonomy and differentiation, various forms of ethno-regionalism, migration pressure, a rising salience of religion, and the accelerated shift of African societies into the so-called parallel economy are profoundly altering the continent’s spatial and social organization, population distribution, and the way markets actually work—and, in so doing, are displacing the material bases of power.<sup>65</sup>

In every country where socio-political configurations before European penetration were already marked, regional differences have been accentuated. Initially this was due to the impact of colonial policies of “exploiting” the territories conquered in the nineteenth century, and later to the impact of the forms of political control instituted after direct colonization. In many cases, the gap between the formal attributes of borders and their economically and culturally changing properties grows ever wider.<sup>66</sup> Conflict has arisen almost everywhere that ethnic groups claiming to enjoy a *ius soli* feel overtaken economically by a majority of “outsiders.” The feeling of belonging is forged and identities reinvented increasingly through the medium of disputes over what belongs to whom and through manipulation of “indigenoussness” and ancestral descent. Whole areas, whether or not occupied by armed bands, are devoid of civil authority.

As a result of these dynamics of territorial realignment and spatial dislocation, the real map of the continent is in the process of being reshaped

along regional and international axes of traffics that both overlap and transcend the historic routes and networks of nineteenth century trade expansion.<sup>67</sup> This is true of the old caravan routes along the edges of the Sahel, the Atlantic routes, the networks (for carrying ivory and precious stones) linking Senegambia to Shaba,<sup>68</sup> and Shaba to southern Africa; it is true of traffic on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, exchanges around the Nile headwaters, and whole zones where, alongside the official structures, a multiplicity of currencies coexist and are exchanged, sometimes with the active connivance of formal bureaucracies, and, increasingly, under the control of what remains of the revenue collection system, the judicial system, and, above all, the soldiery.<sup>69</sup>

For the rest, borders are acquiring political significations, in so far as these no longer simply separate states from one another but are becoming “internal” to states themselves (as with some regions of the Congo, the countries around the Great Lakes, Uganda and southern Sudan). One key feature of an ever-growing number of states is that whole areas (such as vast swathes of Ubangi-Shari) are effectively left to their own devices, with pockets of territory more or less emptied of inhabitants and abandoned, and gaps and intermediate spaces where no writ runs are appearing within a single state.

These processes are accompanied by an unprecedented resurgence of local identities, an extraordinary insistence on family and clan antecedents and birthplaces, and a revival of ethnic imaginations. In most of the major urban centers faced with land problems, distinctions between “indigenes,” “sons of the soil,” and “outsiders” have become commonplace.<sup>70</sup> This proliferation of internal borders—whether imaginary, symbolic, or a cover for economic or power struggles—and its corollary, the exacerbation of identification with particular localities, give rise to exclusionary practices, “identity closure,” and persecution, which, as seen, can easily lead to pogroms, even genocide.<sup>71</sup>

Alongside these dynamics, a specific form of violence is developing: warfare. We should note in this connection that, in the context of contraction and economic depression discussed above, most wars, although they have disastrous short- and long-term consequences, are still “little” wars. Even when they involve a country’s armed forces, they are, in general, wars between bands and, commonly, wars of rapine pitting one set of predators against others. They involve few persons and relatively simple weaponry. But, while their tactics are quite rudimentary, they still result in human catastrophes. This is because military pressure sometimes targets the straightforward destruction, if not of the civilian population,

at least of the very means of its survival, such as food reserves, cattle, and agricultural implements.<sup>72</sup> Pillage and extortion are far from uncommon. In some cases, these wars have enabled band leaders to exercise more or less continuous control over territory. Such control gives them access not only to those living in the territories but also to the natural resources and the goods produced there—for instance, to extraction of precious stones, exploitation of timber or rubber, or ivory poaching.

The financing of these wars is very complex. It is not enough to hold people to ransom, live off the country, or pillage it. In addition to the financial contribution provided by diasporas and assignment of men and women to forced labor for portage and supply of troops, there is resort to loans, appeal to private financiers, and special forms of taxation. To raise troops, and above all to equip them, funds are obtained from companies operating in the territory a faction controls; these companies continue to exploit the resource or ore, which they then export on the world market; in return, they transfer large sums to those who control that portion of territory, either by bills of exchange or by other channels—cash payments, for example. This war taxation system also includes various financial expedients such as fines and licenses, as well as extortion, confiscation of property, and forced contributions.

The violence of war and control of the means of coercion weigh decisively today in the organization of postcolonial societies. Where it happens, war provokes a rearrangement of the ways territory and people are administered, as well as a transformation of the ways resources are tapped and distributed, of the framework in which disputes are settled. These new forms of more or less total control not only blur the supposed relationship between citizenship and democracy; they in fact *incapacitate* whole sections of the population politically.

On the other hand, war, where it occurs, does not necessarily lead, as once in Europe, to the development of the state apparatus or to monopolization by the state of the use of force within its borders. In current circumstances, there is nothing automatic about the link between war and the emergence of an undisputed central power. But what is true is that this military activity will be one means by which new models of domination will take shape on the continent. In some cases, a reconfigured form of state will prevail and transform itself, if need be, into the principal technology of that domination. In many other circumstances, such will not be the case. Here, as in other areas, much will depend on the interplay and interlocking of local and international factors. But it remains that war situations force a renegotiation of the relations between the in-

dividual and the community, the foundations on which authority is exercised, and the relationship of the individual and community to time, space, profit, and the occult.<sup>73</sup>

## DEMOCRACY AS A POSSIBILITY

Discussion of the phenomenon of war must not ignore that distinction between a state of war and a state of peace is increasingly illusory. Earlier, we noted the emergence of a model of exploitation based on the privatization of sovereignty and capital in the form of rent, predation, and an economy based on concessions. Several times we have suggested the absence—more and more commonly observed—of any distinction between activities of extortion and, on the other hand, “corruption” or war-like activities. Now we must return to the central question of *fiscality* in its relation to the other model of domination known as democracy.<sup>74</sup>

It is well known that, all through the history of modern societies, taxation has provided the ultimate economic foundation of the state, just as the monopoly of legitimate violence was one key to state-building. It was through taxation that force and arbitrary rule were converted into authority, coercion into exchange. In the West, for example, taxation has always been more than just a price, even for public services. By paying tax, the individual subject contributes, as an individual, to public expenditure made at common expense. Of course, he or she may derive some private satisfaction from this. But it is never the individual who determines what proportion of his/her income should be set aside for the state. For the financial and economic computation required by taxation always involves that other power, the state, and, beyond, the various interest groups that fight, oppose one another, reach compromises. Finally, the collective constraint inherent in the fiscal relationship never rules out the possibility of an exchange relationship between taxpayers and state. It is that exchange relationship—by which the fiscal subject “purchases” rights over the state—that distinguishes political democracies from systems based on coercion and arbitrariness, since, in this latter case, what is called the “common good” or “public utility” is never supposed to be the object of public debate.

But, returning to the dimension of violence, we should note that underlying tax-raising is a relationship based on compulsion. It used to be where this relationship of violence was manifested par excellence was war, and was made visible in the form of the booty that conquerors seized. Booty made it possible to pay the warriors and feed them; on occasion,

war itself could be a source of enrichment. But in most cases, booty was, despite conventions, collected in a haphazard manner, often in the form of pillage lasting only as long as the raid itself. Over the long term, the productivity of booty was unpredictable, since pillage exhausted capital without necessarily leading to an increase in goods, since raiding was profoundly destructive. The population raided was not left in possession of its goods; what it produced, what it most clung to, ceased to exist; its work was wasted. And where people had managed to save their lives, only terror and fear remained. The material devastation could be such that the transfer of wealth, the acquisition of profit, and the prospects of ransom through pillage often ended up disrupting trade and credit. Moreover, such a relationship created a bond only for the short time of the conquest. This might or might not be followed by an occupation or by creation of a protectorate subject to tribute. It was thus a purely one-off action, with almost nothing in return.

The issue of taxation became a political issue from the moment it was decided to put an end to disorder, make law, control private violence, and produce order. Initially, the issue could then be settled by raising a tribute, requisitioning goods, or forcing compulsory labor. In these three typical cases, the subject groups often retained the freedom to earn their living—although, as they were forced to work without recompense, they were often necessarily removed from everyday activity. A portion of their resources, their time, their labor, and the product of that labor was granted to those ruling them—in kind or, later, in cash. The key feature of this dealing was its arbitrariness. The political significance of taxation at the dawn of modern times arose when people began to seek to transform that arbitrariness into reciprocal obligation between sovereign and subject, thereby establishing a close relation between the institution of taxation, on the one hand, and the process of political emancipation, of taking the road to citizenship, on the other.

In the countries of the West, this process occurred over a long period. It was closely bound up with profound changes in social structures, trade, the means of making war, the techniques of law, conceptions of the public good and general utility, and the relations between state, society, and the market. Let us look at France, for example. Originally, the royal tax was called an “aid,” “hearth tax” (*fouage*), for “subsidy.” It only later took the name “*taille*.” An “aid” is literally a help given to a person or entity in need. One intervenes on the person’s behalf, combining efforts with him/her. An aid is a temporary help; if raised permanently it becomes extraordinary. An aid cannot be extorted; there

is a bond of dependence between the one who receives it and the one who grants it.

What distinguished the “*fouage*” from the aid was that the “*fouage*” was a due paid by household. The “subsidy” constituted something additional paid to an individual or group as an allowance, or in return for services rendered. This was how custom operated. In the logic of the relationship between suzerains and vassals, the king was obliged to raise revenue from his domain, just like every other noble of the time. But the rules of feudalism provided that, in the event of need, and notably to supplement revenues from its domain, the monarchy could call for temporary aids, in a framework set by custom. The “*taille*” was a land-tax levied by lords, in the framework of the feudal system. Only later did royal authority become involved in the *taille*, after supplanting customary authorities, breaking their resistance, and freeing itself of the authorization that it was supposed to receive from the Estates-General. The whole non-combatant population was liable to this tribute.

Three ideas lay behind this levy. First, by paying the *taille*, the non-combatant population was, as it were, buying itself out of conscription, thus exempting it from direct part in the endless wars of the time, while guaranteeing it possession of the rest of its property thus protected from pillage. Second, the *taille* was only raised exceptionally and temporarily—at least, originally. It was an extraordinary “tax” levied only in times of war, and there was no reason, in theory, for it to survive once specific cause for it no longer existed. Finally, it was not part of regalian rights; since it did not constitute a regular duty owed by subjects to the sovereign, it could not be raised without the consent of those paying it.<sup>75</sup> Initially, one function of taxation was to acquire the means (men, supplies, money, weapons) to make war. Taxation filled a vital function in the formation of Western states, in that its introduction was indispensable to the establishment and financing of a major military and revenue-raising apparatus. The establishment of such a centralized apparatus was part of a long shift from the right to wage private war—a right claimed and exercised, down to the close of the Middle Ages, by feudal lords—to the idea of that monopoly of the right to wage war belonged to the king as sovereign and responsible for public order. Taxation was thus instrumental in the birth and development of two interrelated concepts, public authority and the common good.

These two concepts developed and asserted themselves in opposition to the customary usage, the resort to private violence to secure justice. Slowly, the notion of public authority exercised in the interests of the com-

mon good began to supplant that of the right to private violence.<sup>76</sup> There thus came about a monopoly of violence and a monopoly of taxation—the one reinforcing and justifying the other.<sup>77</sup> But there was never any taxation without some organization of coercion—that is, of a manner of “maltreating one’s subjects,” administering them, ensuring extraction from them, exploiting and dominating them. Organizing coercion always presupposed stable exercise of control over a territory’s population. Such control only had meaning if it authorized access to some resources, goods, and services produced on that territory.

We are thus faced with two contradictory trends. On the one hand, there is a principle universally accepted since Roman times, recalled by practitioners of the law whenever necessary, the *right to levy taxation* as an attribute of sovereign power. On the other hand, *consent* to taxation gradually became a principle of public law: the sovereign, having outside his or her domain, no right to levy taxes at his/her sole discretion. And to obtain the consent of the lords and provincial estates, he/she had to demonstrate exceptional needs. There was tension, too, between the free and voluntary character of taxation and its compulsory dimension. These two theories of taxation would confront each other until their reconciliation in the democratic regime, but the tradition extended to the colonies in the nineteenth century was one in which the state, in the figure of a king or queen, was in charge of the life, honor, and property of his/her subjects. According to this tradition, subjects only possess property as usufruct. In reality, property belongs to the suzerain and the state by right of sovereignty; the sovereign and the state leave the subject only its enjoyment. In some cases, indeed, the sovereign might dispose of the property of individuals against their will. By demanding tax, the state and sovereign were simply taking back part of what was properly theirs. Again according to this tradition, taxation is justified, on the one hand, by the need to ensure public prosperity and the common good; on the other, it is explained by concern to keep subjects obedient. It is in this latter sense that taxation is the very mark of subjection. Thanks to taxation, subjects never forget their condition, since, in Richelieu’s words, “If they were free of tribute, they would think they could be free of obedience.” Like mules, they must be habituated to their burden.<sup>78</sup>

Let us return to the African case to underline that, in the contexts described above, a new form of organizing power resting on control of the principal means of coercion (armed force, means of intimidation, imprisonment, expropriation, killing) is emerging in the framework of territories that are no longer fully states. For, in these states, borders are

poorly defined or, at any event, change in accordance with the vicissitudes of military activity, yet the exercise of the right to raise taxes, seize provisions, tributes, tolls, rents, *tailles*, tithes, and exactions make it possible to finance bands of fighters, a semblance of a civil apparatus, and an apparatus of coercion while participating in the formal and informal international networks of inter-state movements of currencies and wealth (such as ivory, diamonds, timber, ores). This is the situation in those countries where the process of privatizing sovereignty has been combined with war and has rested on a novel interlocking between the interests of international middlemen, businessmen, and dealers, and those of local plutocrats.<sup>79</sup>

From whatever point examined, what we are witnessing in Africa is clearly the establishment of a different political economy and the invention of new systems of coercion and exploitation. For the time being, the question is whether these processes will or will not result in emergence of a system of capitalized coercion sufficiently coherent to push through changes in the organization of production and the class structure of African societies, and whether it will prove possible for the submission of Africans required by these processes, and the exclusion and inequalities involved, to acquire legitimacy, and for the violence that goes with them to be tamed to the point of again becoming a public good. One may also wonder how far the violence (pillage, riots, extortion, etc.) and inequality inherent in these processes threaten to precipitate the destruction of the “civility” known to be a key feature of citizenship. The crisis of the taxation system, shortages, and population movements that accompany these reorderings suggest that, for the time being, there is simply a struggle among predators. But nothing allows us to say that, in the long run, prosperity and democracy cannot be born out of crime. Meanwhile, below the state sphere new forms of belonging and social incorporation are gestating, with the formation of “leagues,” “corporations,” “coalitions,” and so on. There is no doubt that most of the religious and healing movements proliferating in Africa today constitute visible, if ambiguous, sites where new normative systems, new common languages, and the constitution of new authorities are being negotiated.<sup>80</sup> But here again, nothing allows us to say that the multiplication of these “separate spheres” and their affirmation in the public space reflects anything other than a heteronomous and fragmented conception of the “political community.”

The basic question, of the emergence of a subject with rights, remains unresolved. The history of other regions of the world shows that taxa-

tion was what, apart from interpersonal allegiances, defined the bond between ruled and rulers. The state surely had the means to “oblige” subjects who had rights, but, at least in theory, it could only impose an obligation on them by putting itself under one. It only had the right to levy taxes to the extent that its subjects, represented in assemblies, exercised rights over the tax and how it was levied or expended. It was through this process that the state could define itself as a common good, as no longer simply a relationship of domination. It was also through this process that it converted its power to impose an obligation by placing an obligation on itself, into a power to state the law. And finally, it was through this process that subjects took for themselves a status in the political order—in that, by paying tax and exercising rights over its destination, they gave legal force to their political capacity and capacities as citizens. They did so by entering into the play of rights and claims with the state, which, in so doing, provided itself with public credit, precisely because it was using its sovereign power in a way that respected what was a matter of right. This is what is at stake in the ongoing struggles in Africa.

## NOTES

1. See the overview by M. Diouf, “Libéralisations politiques ou transitions démocratiques: perspectives africaines” (paper presented at the Eighth General Meeting of CODESRIA, Dakar, 26 June–2 July 1995), or C. Monga, *Anthropology of Anger: Civil Society and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), ch. 1.

2. See, *inter alia*, the studies by G. Fonseca, “Économie de la drogue: taille, caractéristiques et impact économique”; B. Destremau, “Les enjeux du qat au Yémen”; A. Labrousse, “La culture du pavot dans le district de Dir (Pakistan): Économie paysanne, productions illicites, et alternatives de développement dans le contexte d’un conflit régional,” all in *Revue Tiers Monde* 33, 131 (1992).

3. Regarding this period, and for a political interpretation of these processes, see the synthesis by J. Lonsdale, “The European Scramble and Conquest in African History,” in *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 680–766; B. O. Oloruntimehin, “The Impact of the Abolition Movement on the Social and Political Development of West Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” *Ibadan* 7, 1 (1972): 38–58. For an assessment of the economic dimensions of this turning-point, see, among others, A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London: Longman, 1973).

4. On these local variations, see, for example, the studies in D. Birmingham and P. M. Martin, eds., *History of Central Africa*, vol. 1 (London: Longman, 1990). Generally, see F. Cooper, “Africa and the World Economy,” *African Studies Review* 29, 2–3 (1981).

5. On this subject see P. Manning, *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); R. Law, "Ideologies of Raw Power: The Dissolution and Reconstruction of Political Authority on the Slave Coast, 1680–1750," *Africa* 57 (1987): 321–44, on Dahomey; to a lesser extent, T. McCaskie, *State and Society in Asante* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

6. See J. Lonsdale, "States and Social Processes in Africa," *African Studies Review* 29, 2–3 (1981).

7. C. Meillassoux, *Anthropologie de l'esclavage: Le ventre de fer et d'argent* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), 143–235, [Eng. tr. A. Dasnois, *The Anthropology of Slavery: The Womb of Iron and Gold*, London: Athlone Press, 1991, 141–235], contains useful information on the organization and functioning of these systems and on the manner of political competition within them.

8. See examples in E. Terray, *Une histoire du royaume abron de Gyaman* (Paris: Karthala, 1995) 185–90.

9. For example, S. Johnson, *The History of the Yorubas from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate* (London, 1921, 206–73); S. A. Akintoye, *Revolution and Power Politics in Yorubaland, 1840–1893* (New York: Humanities Press, 1971).

10. On the political history of ancient Dahomey see I. A. Akinjogbin, *Dahomey and its Neighbours, 1708–1818* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). On the institution of the royal cult through the practice of human sacrifice, see R. Law, "Human Sacrifice in Pre-Colonial West Africa," *African Affairs* 84, 334 (1985): 53–87. On the redistribution of utilities and benefits, there is useful information in C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, "La fête des coutumes au Dahomey," *Annales* 19 (1964): 696–716, and K. Polanyi, *Dahomey and the Slave Trade* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966). For the rest, see R. Law, "Ideologies of Royal Power: The Dissolution and Reconstruction of Political Authority on the 'Slave Coast,' 1680–1750," *Africa* 57, 3 (1987): 321–44.

11. C. C. Stewart, "Frontier Disputes and Problems of Legitimation: Sokoto-Macina Relations, 1817–1837," *Journal of African History* 17, 4 (1976): 495–514.

12. As E. Terray brings out clearly in *Une histoire du royaume abron du Gyaman* (Paris: Karthala, 1995).

13. As D. Cordell notes, the history of the Khartoumites is closely associated with Egyptian expansion into what is now Sudan and northeastern Zaire. Between 1821 and 1879, Muhammad Ali and his successors had carved out a vast virtual empire in the heart of Africa. The Egyptians had established themselves at Khartoum and, with the support of traders of various other nationalities, had infiltrated agents all over the region; these agents had joined the itinerant traders already there. See D. Cordell, "The Savanna Belt of North-Central Africa," in D. Birmingham and P. M. Martin, eds., *History of Central Africa*, vol. 1, 64–65.

14. *Ibid.*, 30–74. For developments on the South Atlantic coast see the chapter by J. C. Miller, "The Paradoxes of Impoverishment in the Atlantic Zone," in the same volume, 118–59.

15. The cycle of indebtedness was not new. It had been a cornerstone of the overseas slave trade, as brought out in J. Miller, *Way of Death* (Madison: Uni-

versity of Wisconsin Press, 1988). See also H. A. Gemery and J. S. Hogendorn, eds., *The Uncommon Market: Essays on the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (New York: Academic Press, 1970), 303–30.

16. See J. F. A. Ajayi, *Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841–1891: The Making of a New Elite* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 1–24; J. and J. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

17. A. J. H. Latham, “Witchcraft Accusations and Economic Tension in Pre-Colonial Old Calabar,” *Journal of African History* 13, 2 (1972): 249–60.

18. M. Last, “Reform in West Africa: The Jihad Movements of the Nineteenth Century,” in J. F. A. Ajayi and M. Crowder, eds., *History of West Africa*, vol. 2 (London: Longman, 1988); M. A. Klein, “Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia,” *Journal of African History* 13, 3 (1972): 419–41.

19. See J. E. Inikori, “The Import of Firearms into West Africa, 1750–1807: A Quantitative Analysis,” *Journal of African History* 18, 3 (1977): 339–68; B. Awe, “Militarism and Economic Development in Nineteenth Century Yoruba Country: The Ibadan Example,” *Journal of African History* 14, 1 (1973): 65–78.

20. See El-Zubeir Pasha, *Black Ivory, or the Story of El-Zubeir Pasha, Slaver and Sultan, as Told by Himself*, Eng. trans. H. C. Jackson (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1970); W. K. R. Hallam, “The Itinerary of Rabih Fadl Allah, 1879–1893,” *Bulletin de l’Institut Fondamental de l’Afrique Noire*, series B, 30, 1 (1968): 165–81, and Hallam’s biography of Rabeh, *The Life and Times of Rabih Fadl Allah* (London, 1977); R. A. Adeleye, “Rabih b. Fadlallah, 1879–93: Exploits and Impact on Political Relations in Central Sudan,” *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 2 (1970): 223–42; M. F. Page, “The Manyema Hordes of Tippu Tipp,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 1 (1974): 69–84.

21. See the study by S. P. Reyna, *Wars without End: The Political Economy of a Precolonial African State* (Hanover: N.H.: University Press of New England, 1990).

22. See the classic study by C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires, 1898–1930* (Paris: Mouton, 1977).

23. See E. D. Morel, *Red Rubber: The Story of the Rubber Trade Flourishing on the Congo in the Year of Grace 1906* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), reprint of the 1906 edition.

24. B. Barry, *La Sénégalie* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1986); I. Wilks, *Asante in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); R. Richards, “Production and Reproduction in Warrior States: Segu Bambara and Segu Tukulor, c. 1712–1890,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 13 (1980): 389–419; R. Law, “Royal Monopoly and Private Enterprise in the Atlantic Trade: The Case of Dahomey,” *Journal of African History*, 18, 4 (1977): 555–77.

25. C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires*; R. Harms, “The End of Red Rubber: A Reassessment,” *Journal of African History* 16, 1 (1975): 73–88.

26. I. Wilks, *Asante in the Nineteenth Century*; G. I. Jones, *The Trading States of the Oil Rivers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); J. M. Janzen, *Lemba 1650–1930: A Drum of Affliction in Africa and the New World* (New York: Garland, 1982); S. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

27. This “globalism” is not something new: it even has a history. See P. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); F. Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, Fifteenth–Eighteenth Centuries*, 3 vols. (London: Collins, 1981–1984).

28. For details, see A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London: Longman, 1973).

29. D. Bach speaks of “delinking by default” in “Europe-Afrique: Des acteurs en quête de scénarios,” *Études internationales* 22, 2 (1991): 336.

30. That African exports represent an insignificant proportion of those of developing countries need not imply that what is occurring is “marginalization.” Other factors need to be taken into account, such as imports, indebtedness, structural relations with international financial agencies, and the effects of fraud and smuggling. See the study by B. Hibou, *L’Afrique est-elle protectioniste?* (Paris: Karthala, 1996).

31. See the analysis suggested by A. Appadurai in “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” *Public Culture* 2, 2 (1990): 1–24.

32. See J. F. Bayart, ed., *La réinvention du capitalisme* (Paris: Karthala, 1994), especially 9–43.

33. On the case of Egypt, see D. S. Landes, *Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt* (London: Heinemann, 1958). More generally, see B. Eichengreen and P. H. Lindert, ed., *The International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), or C. Sutter, “Long Waves in Core-Periphery Relationships within the International Financial System: Debt-Default Cycles of Sovereign Borrowers,” *Review* 12, 1 (1989): 1–49.

34. See J. Coussy, “État minimum et dépolitisation sous les contraintes extérieures: Le cas des pays en développement,” mimeo., Paris, 1992.

35. S. Haggard and R. Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

36. See the discussion by T. Callaghy of the desirable balance between market logic and state logic, and of the need to “protect” the elites in charge of conceiving and implementing economic reforms from purely political logics, in “Vision and Politics in the Transformation of the Global Political Economy: Lessons from the Second and Third Worlds,” unpublished ms., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, October 1991, 8–12.

37. J. F. Bayart, *L’État en Afrique: La politique du ventre* (Paris: Fayard, 1989). [Trans. M. Harper, C. and E. Harrison, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*, London: Longman, 1993].

38. For similar processes elsewhere, see B. A. Misztal, “Postcommunist Ambivalence: Becoming of a New Formation?” *Archives européennes de sociologie* 37, 1 (1996): 104–40.

39. On aspects of this social protest, see the studies collected by M. Mamdani and E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, eds., *African Social Movements and Democracy* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995).

40. See S. Berry, "Social Institutions and Access to Resources," *Africa*, 59, 1 (1984): 41–55; P. E. Peters, "Manoeuvres and Debates in the Interpretation of Land Rights in Botswana," *Africa* 62, 3 (1992): 413–34. In this latter issue is a useful note by P. Shipton and M. Goheen, "Understanding African Land-Holding: Power, Wealth, and Meaning," 307–25. See also P. Geschiere, *Sorcellerie et politique en Afrique noire: La viande de l'autre* (Paris: Karthala, 1995).

41. See C. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

42. We do not regard these experiments as a deviation or aberration to judge against some model alleged unique. Contrary to the simplistic views expressed by Max Weber and propagated by his disciples, no ideal-type has ever existed, historically, in the world. As products of a human history with no accounts to render to any other human history, these experiments have their own positivity and "lawfulness." They obey, above all, their own reasons and rules. In so doing, they constitute creative forms of interaction with their environment even as they can be the expression of human capacities for destruction—capacities, it should be said, evenly distributed among all historic human formations.

43. See, elsewhere, H. Domanski and B. Heyns, "Toward a Theory of the Role of the State in Market Transition: From Bargaining to Markets in Post-Communism," *Archives européennes de sociologie* 36 (1995): 317–51.

44. On these debates, see B. Hibou, ed., *La privatisation des états* (Paris: Karthala, 1999); P. Windolf, "Privatization and Elite Reproduction in Eastern Europe," *Archives européennes de sociologie* 39, 2 (1998): 335–76.

45. This explains, for example, the conflicts over privatization, as noted in P. Konings, "La liquidation des plantations Unilever et les conflits intra-élites dans le Cameroun anglophone," *Politique africaine*, 35 (1990), or the resurgence of secessionist moves in areas, rich in natural resources exploited by multinationalals, inhabited by minority ethnic groups (the case of the Ogoni in Nigeria).

46. C. Young, "Zaire: The Shattered Illusion of the Integral State," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, 2 (1994): 247–63. Consider also the case of countries such as Somalia.

47. See the chapters "The Aesthetics of Vulgarity," and "The 'Thing' and its Doubles" in this volume.

48. The bureaucrat then finds himself with "thousands of others in the street engaging in a whole host of petty businesses: selling cases of beer bought with foreign exchange in *lojas francas* where everything is available so long as one can pay in 'real money', illegal transport of people and goods, resale of stolen diamonds and other goods fraudulently removed from the city's port or airport," as noted by P. Beaudet in "Fin de guerre en Angola: Crise économique, crise de société," *Politique africaine*. See also A. Morice, "Guinée 85: État, corruptions, et trafics," *Les temps modernes*, no. 487 (1987); A. Mbembe and J. Roitman, "Figures of the Subject in Times of Crisis," *Public Culture* 7, 2 (1995).

49. J. F. Bayart, in *L'État en Afrique*, has already analysed this phenomenon, which he calls the "rhizome state." Here we seek to make the link between this

structuring into networks, and the process of concentrating and dispersing the means of coercion.

50. At least in the meaning given by R. Horton in "Stateless Societies," in J. F. A. Ajayi and M. Crowder, eds., *History of West Africa*, vol. 1.

51. Weber uses this notion in an attempt to contrast the West with the East and show that in the East no form of exploitation associated with *corvée* (obligatory service) developed, but instead extraction of forced payments predominated. See his *Histoire économique: Esquisse d'une histoire universelle de l'économie et de la société*, Fr. trans. C. Bouchindhomme (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 87–89.

52. See World Bank, *The Many Faces of Poverty: Status Report on Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1994* (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, Human Resources and Poverty Division, Africa Technical Department, 1994).

53. See K. Arkin, "The Economic Implications of Transformations in Akan Funeral Rites," *Africa* 64, 3 (1994): 307–21; and C. Bawa Yamba, "Cosmologies in Turmoil: Witchfinding and AIDS in Chiawa, Zambia," *Africa* 67, 2 (1997): 200–23.

54. See B. Jewsiewicki, "Jeux d'argent et de pouvoir au Zaïre: La 'bindomanie' et le crépuscule de la Deuxième République," *Politique africaine* 46 (1992): 55–70.

55. For a purely theoretical view, see P. Guillaumont et al., "De la dépréciation nominale à la dépréciation réelle: Les facteurs d'effectivité des dévaluations dans les pays africains," *Revue économique* 46, 3 (1995): 751–62. In the same issue, see the papers by F. Bourguignon et al. on Côte d'Ivoire and by J. P. Azam on Nigeria.

56. Read the report by J. C. Legrand, "Logique de guerre et dynamique de la violence en Zambézia, 1976–1991," *Politique africaine* 50 (1993): 96–99.

57. See the study by G. Mare, "Inkhata and Regional Control: Policing Liberation Politics," *Review of African Political Economy* 45–46 (1989): 179–89.

58. The expression "tonton-macoute" derives from the Haitian experience. Its origin lies in a creole term for a fantastic, terrifying, and cruel personage, one of whose most noticeable aspects is that of carrying a sack of grain, or "macoute." Later, the term was used to designate the armed militia corps created under the Duvalier regime, one function of which was to accomplish some of the dirtier tasks required by the ruling classes.

59. P. Veyne, "Clientèle et corruption au service de l'État: La vénalité des offices dans le Bas-Empire romain," *Annales ESC* 36, 3 (1981): 339–60.

60. Cf. A. Mbembe, "Des rapports entre la rareté matérielle et la démocratie en Afrique subsaharienne," *Sociétés africaines* 1 (1996).

61. J. Warnier, *L'esprit d'entreprise au Cameroun*, Paris: Karthala, 1993; S. Berry, *Fathers Work for Their Sons, and No Condition Is Permanent* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994).

62. J. Guyer, "Wealth in People and Self-Realization in Equatorial Africa," *Man* (1994).

63. See P. Mathieu, "Compétition foncière, confusion politique, et violences au Kivu: Des dérives irréversibles," *Politique africaine* 67 (1997): 130–36.

64. Cf. M. Weber, *Economy and Society* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968); C. Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

65. Read A. Mbembe, "At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa," *Public Culture* 12, 1 (2000).

66. See for example J. V. Magistro, "Crossing Over: Ethnicity and Transboundary Conflict in the Senegal River Valley," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 130, 33:2, 1993: 201-32.

67. On this market dynamic, cf. the studies by J. R. Gray and D. Birmingham, *Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900* (London, 1970); C. Meillassoux, *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, for International African Institute, 1971); P. Lovejoy and S. Baier, "The Desert-Side Economy of the Central Sudan," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 7, 4 (1975): 551-81; A. J. H. Latham, "Currency, Credit, and Capitalism on the Cross River in the Pre-Colonial Era," *Journal of African History* 12, 4 (1971): 249-60.

68. S. Bredeloup, "L'aventure des diamantaires sénégalais," *Politique africaine* 56 (1994): 77-93.

69. See for example the case studied by K. Meagher, "The Hidden Economy: Informal and Parallel Trade in Northwestern Uganda," *Review of African Political Economy* 47 (1990): 64-83.

70. Cf. certain examples in S. Jaglin and A. Dubresson, eds., *Pouvoirs et cités d'Afrique Noire* (Paris: Karthala, 1993).

71. See for example the study by R. Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). See also F. M. Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1995).

72. See the note by E. Shindo, "Hunger and Weapons: The Entropy of Militarisation," in *Review of African Political Economy*. See also M. Hall, "The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo): A Study in the Destruction of an African Country," *Africa* 60 (1990): 39-68.

73. Cf. T. Allen, "Understanding Alice: Uganda's Holy Spirit Movement in Context," *Africa* 61, 3 (1991): 370-99. See also K. Wilson, "Cults of Violence and Counterviolence in Mozambique," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, 3 (1992): 527-82.

74. Let us recall that, at the beginning of this volume, we designated, under the general notion of fiscality, the various means of appropriating necessary goods and of allocating profits; the types of levies these require, and the intensity of regulation that they imply.

75. On these and the preceding observations, cf. G. Ardant, *Histoire de l'impôt* (Paris: Fayard), and E. Esmonin, *La taille en Normandie au temps de Colbert, 1661-1683* (Geneva: Mégarisot Reprints, 1978), 2-10.

76. Cf. R. W. Kaeuper, *Guerre, justice, et ordre public: La France et l'Angleterre à la fin du Moyen Age*, Fr. trans. N. Genet and J. P. Genet (Paris: Aubier, 1994), 220-26.

77. According to N. Alias, "The armed forces concentrated in the hands of the central power guarantees the collection of funds, and the concentration of fiscal returns in the cash-boxes of the central administration consolidates the monopolization of physical constraint, of military force, these two means of power

thus reinforcing each other"; see *La dynamique de l'Occident* (Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1975), 170. See also L. von Stein, "On Taxation," in Musgrave and Peacock, *Classics in the Theory of Public Finance* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 28–36.

78. On these debates, cf. Richelieu, *Testament politique*, vol. 1, 225; Bossuet, *Politique tirée de l'écriture sainte*, 6, 2, par. 3; Leuret, *De la souveraineté du roy*, book 3, ch. 7; Lacour-Gayet, *L'éducation politique de Louis XIV*, book 2, ch. 8; Bodin, *De la république*, book 1, ch. 8; La Mothe le Vayer, *La politique du prince* (Paris, 1655).

79. See the details contained in the study by W. Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995).

80. See J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff, "Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony," *American Ethnologist* 26, 2 (1999): 279–303.